Objective To examine medical students’ views on conscientious objection and controversial medical procedures.Methods Questionnaire study among Norwegian 5th and 6th year medical students.Results Five hundred and thirty-one of 893 students responded. Respondents object to a range of procedures not limited to abortion —notably euthanasia, ritual circumcision for boys, assisted reproduction for same-sex couples and ultrasound in the setting of prenatal diagnosis. A small minority would object to referrals for abortion. In the case of abortion, up to 55% would tolerate conscientious (...) refusals, whereas 42% would not. Higher proportions would tolerate refusals for euthanasia or ritual circumcision for boys.Discussion A majority of Norwegian medical students would object to participation in euthanasia or ritual circumcision for boys. However, in most settings, many medical students think doctors should not be able to refuse participation on grounds of conscience. A minority would accept conscientious refusals for procedures they themselves do not object to personally. Most students would not accept conscientious refusals for referrals.Conclusions Conscientious objection remains a live issue in the context of several medical procedures not limited to abortion. Although most would want a right to object to participation in euthanasia, tolerance towards conscientious objectors in general was moderate or low. (shrink)

Conscientious objection among physicians is a perennial hot topic on both sides of the Atlantic. Sven Nordstrand's survey of Norwegian medical students adds fresh data to this ongoing debate.1Their starting point, whether doctors should be allowed to refuse any procedure to which they object on cultural, moral or religious grounds, is truly at the heart of the debate. Their finding that only 20.8% of students endorse this position is striking as it is less than half the number reported (...) by Sophie Strickland in her survey of medical students in the UK.2 It also suggests much less support for conscientious objection than was found among USA primary care physicians, where 78% agreed that “A physician should never do what he or she believes is morally wrong, no matter what experts say.”3These data invite speculation about why there is such dramatic variation between countries. Much can be made of Nordstrand's comments that in Norway “each citizen is assigned a particular general practitioner” and “In the Norwegian healthcare system the general practitioner has a crucial role as …. (shrink)

ArgumentIn this paper we comparatively explore three claims concerning the disciplinary character of economics by means of citation analysis. The three claims under study are: (1) economics exhibits strong forms of institutional stratification and, as a byproduct, a rather pronounced internal hierarchy; (2) economists strongly conform to institutional incentives; and (3) modern mainstream economics is a largely self-referential intellectual project mostly inaccessible to disciplinary or paradigmatic outsiders. The validity of these claims is assessed by means of an interdisciplinary comparison of (...) citation patterns aiming to identify peculiar characteristics of economic discourse. In doing so, we emphasize that citation data can always be interpreted in different ways, thereby focusing on the contrast between a “cognitive” and an “evaluative” approach towards citation data. (shrink)

One of the topics that often comes up in ethical discussions of deep brain stimulation (DBS) is the question of what impact DBS has, or might have, on the patient’s self. This is often understood as a question of whether DBS poses a “threat” to personal identity, which is typically understood as having to do with psychological and/or narrative continuity over time. In this article, we argue that the discussion of whether DBS is a “threat” to continuity over time is (...) too narrow. There are other questions concerning DBS and the self that are overlooked in discussions exclusively focusing on psychological and/or narrative continuity. For example, it is also important to investigate whether DBS might sometimes have a positive (e.g. a rehabilitating) effect on the patient’s self. To widen the discussion of DBS, so as to make it encompass a broader range of considerations that bear on DBS’s impact on the self, we identify six features of the commonly used concept of a person’s “true self”. We apply these six features to the relation between DBS and the self. And we end with a brief discussion of the role DBS might play in treating otherwise treatment-refractory anorexia nervosa. This further highlights the importance of discussing both continuity over time and the notion of the true self. (shrink)

The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance for accidents caused by driverless vehicles may delay the introduction of driverless systems (...) that would substantially reduce the risks. Trade-offs will arise between safety and other requirement on the road traffic system. Over-reliance on the swift collision-avoiding reactions of self-driving vehicles can induce people to take dangerous actions, such as stepping out in front of a car, relying on its fast braking. Children travelling alone can violate safety instructions such as the use of seatbelts. Digital information about routes and destinations can be used to convey commercial and political messages to car users. If fast passage can be bought, then socio-economic segregation of road traffic may result. Terrorists and other criminals can hack into a vehicle and make it crash. They can also use self-driving vehicles for instance to carry bombs to their designed places of detonation or to wreak havoc on a country’s road system. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss the ethics of automated driving. More specifically, we discuss responsible human-robot coordination within mixed traffic: i.e. traffic involving both automated cars and conventional human-driven cars. We do three main things. First, we explain key differences in robotic and human agency and expectation-forming mechanisms that are likely to give rise to compatibility-problems in mixed traffic, which may lead to crashes and accidents. Second, we identify three possible solution-strategies for achieving better human-robot coordination within mixed traffic. Third, (...) we identify important ethical challenges raised by each of these three possible strategies for achieving optimized human-robot cordination in this domain. Among other things, we argue that we should not just explore ways of making robotic driving more like human driving. Rather, we ought also to take seriously potential ways of making human driving more like robotic driving. Nor should we assume that complete automation is always the ideal to aim for; in some traffic-situations, the best results may be achieved through human-robot collaboration. Ultimately, our main aim in this paper is to argue that the new field of the ethics of automated driving needs take seriously the ethics of mixed traffic and responsible human-robot coordination. (shrink)

Some critics of sex-robots worry that their use might spread objectifying attitudes about sex, and common sense places a higher value on sex within love-relationships than on casual sex. If there could be mutual love between humans and sex-robots, this could help to ease the worries about objectifying attitudes. And mutual love between humans and sex-robots, if possible, could also help to make this sex more valuable. But is mutual love between humans and robots possible, or even conceivable? We discuss (...) three clusters of ideas and associations commonly discussed within the philosophy of love, and relate these to the topic of whether mutual love could be achieved between humans and sex-robots: (i) the idea of love as a “good match”; (ii) the idea of valuing each other in our distinctive particularity; and (iii) the idea of a steadfast commitment. We consider relations among these ideas and the sort of agency and free will that we attribute to human romantic partners. Our conclusion is that mutual love between humans and advanced sex-robots is not an altogether impossible proposition. However, it is unlikely that we will be able to create robots sophisticated enough to be able to participate in love-relationships anytime soon. -/- . (shrink)

It has been much debated whether epistemic relativism in academia, for instance in the form of social constructivism, the strong programme, deconstructionism, and postmodernism, has paved the way for the recent upsurge in science denial, in particular climate science denial. In order to provide an empirical basis for this discussion, an extensive search of the social science literature was performed. It showed that in the 1990s, climate science was a popular target among academic epistemic relativists. In particular, many STS scholars (...) used it as an allegedly clear example of claims by natural scientists that should be treated as mere social constructions, rather than as reports on the actual state of the natural world. A few connections between social constructivists and corporate science denialism were also uncovered, but the extent of such connections could not be determined. With few exceptions, the stream of criticism of climate science from academic relativists has dwindled since the 1990s. One reason for this seems to be that the contrarian position lost its attraction when it became associated with corporate and right-wing propagandists. (shrink)

How might emerging and future technologies—sex robots, love drugs, anti-love drugs, or algorithms to track, quantify, and ‘gamify’ romantic relationships—change how we understand and value love? We canvass some of the main ethical worries posed by such technologies, while also considering whether there are reasons for “cautious optimism” about their implications for our lives. Along the way, we touch on some key ideas from the philosophies of love and technology.

Specified meet contraction is the operation defined by the identity where ∼ is full meet contraction and f is a sentential selector, a function from sentences to sentences. With suitable conditions on the sentential selector, specified meet contraction coincides with the partial meet contractions that yield a finite-based contraction outcome if the original belief set is finite-based. In terms of cognitive realism, specified meet contraction has an advantage over partial meet contraction in that the selection mechanism operates on sentences rather (...) than on temporary infinite structures (remainders) that are cognitively inaccessible. Specified meet contraction provides a versatile framework in which other types of contraction, such as severe withdrawal and base-generated contraction, can be expressed with suitably chosen properties of the sentential selector. (shrink)

In this paper, we engage in dialogue with Jonathan Pugh, Hannah Maslen, and Julian Savulescu about how to best interpret the potential impacts of deep brain stimulation on the self. We consider whether ordinary people’s convictions about the true self should be interpreted in essentialist or existentialist ways. Like Pugh et al., we argue that it is useful to understand the notion of the true self as having both essentialist and existentialist components. We also consider two ideas from existentialist philosophy (...) – Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir’s ideas about “bad faith” and “ambiguity” – to argue that there can be value to patients in regarding themselves as having a certain amount of freedom to choose what aspects of themselves should be considered representative of their true selves. Lastly, we consider the case of an anorexia nervosa-patient who shifts between conflicting mind-sets. We argue that mind-sets in which it is easier for the patient and his or her family to share values can plausibly be considered to be more representative of the patient’s true self, if this promotes a well-functioning relationship between the patient and the family. However, we also argue that families are well-advised to give patients room to figure out what such shared values mean to them, since it can be alienating for patients if they feel that others try to impose values on them from the outside. (shrink)

Large Language Models (LLMs) “assign probabilities to sequences of text. When given some initial text, they use these probabilities to generate new text. Large language models are language models u...

In her 1993 book Freedom within Reason, Susan Wolf discusses what she identifies as an asymmetry between the good and the bad: to qualify as doing good in a praiseworthy way, it is not necessary that one should have the ability to do otherwise, but in order to qualify as doing something bad in a blameworthy way, it is necessary that one has the ability to do otherwise. In this chapter, I relate this asymmetry between the good and the bad (...) that Wolf discusses to a range of other asymmetries between the good and the bad that various philosophers – both historical figures and contemporary philosophers – have identified. I discuss different ways of thinking about the relations among these supposed asymmetries between the good and the bad, identify different ways in which one can relate to these ideas in one’s philosophical thinking, and lastly also argue that the long history of philosophical reflections on asymmetries between the good and the bad is interesting to contemporary discussions within applied ethics. In particular, I relate these ideas about asymmetries between the good and the bad to contemporary discussions about moral responsibility – and possible gaps in responsibility – within the ethics of artificial intelligence. (shrink)

Close connections between probability theory and the theory of belief change emerge if the codomain of probability functions is extended from the real-valued interval [0, 1] to a hyperreal interval with the same limits. Full beliefs are identified as propositions with a probability at most infinitesimally smaller than 1. Full beliefs can then be given up, and changes in the set of full beliefs follow a pattern very close to that of AGM revision. In this contribution, iterated revision is investigated. (...) The iterated changes in the set of full beliefs generated by repeated revisions of a hyperreal probability function can, semantically, be modelled with the same basic structure as the sphere models of belief change theory. The changes on the set of full beliefs induced by probability revision satisfy the Darwiche–Pearl postulates for iterated belief change. (shrink)

PurposeIn this article, we aim to present and defend a contextual approach to mathematical explanation.MethodTo do this, we introduce an epistemic reading of mathematical explanation.ResultsThe epistemic reading not only clarifies the link between mathematical explanation and mathematical understanding, but also allows us to explicate some contextual factors governing explanation. We then show how several accounts of mathematical explanation can be read in this approach.ConclusionThe contextual approach defended here clears up the notion of explanation and pushes us towards a pluralist vision (...) on mathematical explanation. (shrink)

We argue that non-epistemic values, including moral ones, play an important role in the construction and choice of models in science and engineering. Our main claim is that non-epistemic values are not only “secondary values” that become important just in case epistemic values leave some issues open. Our point is, on the contrary, that non-epistemic values are as important as epistemic ones when engineers seek to develop the best model of a process or problem. The upshot is that models are (...) neither value-free, nor depend exclusively on epistemic values or use non-epistemic values as tie-breakers. (shrink)

This article develops a notion of the ‘politics of time’ in order to analyse the effects that imaginations of future emergencies have in the fields of law and economy. Building on Niklas Luhmann’s theory of social time, it focuses on the multiplex temporalities in contemporary society, which are shown to interact differently with the ‘emergency imaginary’. We demonstrate that the apprehension of the future in terms of sudden, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic events reinforces current modes of producing financial futurity, while (...) it undermines the procedural rhythm and retroactive sentencing of liberal law. As a whole, the article supplements the analysis of the ‘politics of truth’ prevalent in the current debate about precaution and pre-emption with a theoretical perspective on social temporality. (shrink)

A new formal model of belief dynamics is proposed, in which the epistemic agent has both probabilistic beliefs and full beliefs. The agent has full belief in a proposition if and only if she considers the probability that it is false to be so close to zero that she chooses to disregard that probability. She treats such a proposition as having the probability 1, but, importantly, she is still willing and able to revise that probability assignment if she receives information (...) that gives her sufficient reasons to do so. Such a proposition is undoubted, but not undoubtable. In the formal model it is assigned a probability 1 − δ, where δ is an infinitesimal number. The proposed model employs probabilistic belief states that contain several underlying probability functions representing alternative probabilistic states of the world. Furthermore, a distinction is made between update and revision, in the same way as in the literature on belief change. The formal properties of the model are investigated, including properties relevant for learning from experience. The set of propositions whose probabilities are infinitesimally close to 1 forms a belief set. Operations that change the probabilistic belief state give rise to changes in this belief set, which have much in common with traditional operations of belief change. (shrink)

The precautionary principle has often been described as an extreme principle that neglects science and stifles innovation. However, such an interpretation has no support in the official definitions of the principle that have been adopted by the European Union and by the signatories of international treaties on environmental protection. In these documents, the precautionary principle is a guideline specifying how to deal with certain types of scientific uncertainty. In this contribution, this approach to the precautionary principle is explicated with the (...) help of concepts from the philosophy of science and comparisons with general notions of practical rationality. Three major problems in its application are discussed, and it is concluded that to serve its purpose, the precautionary principle has to (1) be combined with other decision principles in cases with competing top priorities, (2) be based on the current state of science, which requires procedures for scientific updates, and (3) exclude potential dangers whose plausibility is too low to trigger meaningful precautionary action. (shrink)

In the last half century, decision theory has had a deep influence on moral theory. Its impact has largely been beneficial. However, it has also given rise to some problems, two of which are discussed here. First, issues such as risk-taking and risk imposition have been left out of ethics since they are believed to belong to decision theory, and consequently the ethical aspects of these issues have not been treated in either discipline. Secondly, ethics has adopted the decision-theoretical idea (...) that action-guidance has to be based on cause–effect or means–ends relationships between an individual action and its possible outcomes. This is problematic since the morally relevant connections between an action and future events are not fully covered by such relationships. In response to the first problem it is proposed that moral theory should deal directly and extensively with issues such as risk-taking and risk imposition, thereby intruding unabashedly into the traditional territory of decision theory. As a partial response to the second problem it is proposed that moral theorizing should release itself from the decision-theoretical requirement that the moral status of an action has to be derivable from the consequences (or other properties) that are assignable to that action alone. In particular, the effects that an action can have in combination with other actions by the same or other agents are valid arguments in an action-guiding moral discourse, even if its contribution to these combined consequences cannot be isolated and evaluated separately. (shrink)

It is commonly thought that on Kant’s view of action, ‘everyone always acts on maxims.’ Call this the ‘descriptive reading.’ This reading faces two important problems: first, the idea that people always act on maxims offends against common sense: it clashes with our ordinary ideas about human agency. Second, there are various passages in which Kant says that it is ‘rare’ and ‘admirable’ to firmly adhere to a set of basic principles that we adopt for ourselves. This article offers an (...) alternative: the ‘normative reading.’ On this reading, it is a normative ideal to adopt and act on maxims: it is one of the things Kant thinks we would do if our reason were fully in control of our decision-making. (shrink)

Two recent defences of the recovery postulate for contraction of belief sets are analyzed. It is concluded that recovery is defensible as a by-product of a formalization that is idealized in the sense of being simplified for the sake of clarity. However, recovery does not seem to be a required feature of the doxastic behaviour of ideal (perfectly rational) agents. It is reasonable to expect that there should be epistemic residues (remnants of rejected beliefs), but not that these should always (...) suffice to recover all the original beliefs if the discarded belief is reinstated. (shrink)

A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, (...) coherentists have to accept a weak version of epistemic priority, that sorts out merely derived beliefs. Furthermore, it is shown that in belief revision theory, coherence cannot be adequately represented by logical closure, but has to be represented separately. (shrink)

Generalizations of partial meet contraction are introduced that start out from the observation that only some of the logically closed subsets of the original belief set are at all viable as contraction outcomes. Belief contraction should proceed by selection among these viable options. Several contraction operators that are based on such selection mechanisms are introduced and then axiomatically characterized. These constructions are more general than the belief base approach. It is shown that partial meet contraction is exactly characterized by adding (...) to one of these constructions the condition that all logically closed subsets of the belief set can be obtained as the outcome of a single (multiple) contraction. Examples are provided showing the counter-intuitive consequences of that condition, thus confirming the credibility of the proposed generalization of the AGM framework. (shrink)

Mainstream risk analysis deviates in at least two important respects from the rationality ideal of mainstream economics. First, expected utility maximization is not applied in a consistent way. It is applied to endodoxastic uncertainty, i.e. the uncertainty (or risk) expressed in a risk assessment, but in many cases not to metadoxastic uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty about which of several competing assessments is correct. Instead, a common approach to metadoxastic uncertainty is to only take the most plausible assessment into account. This will (...) typically lead to risk-prone deviations from risk-neutrality. Secondly, risks and benefits for different persons are added to form a total value of risk. Such calculations are used to support the view that one should accept being exposed to a risk if it brings greater benefits for others. This is in stark contrast to modern Paretian welfare economics, that refrains from interindividual comparisons and does not require people to accept a disadvantage because it brings a larger advantage for others. (Published Online July 11 2006). (shrink)

Attentional character is a way of thinking about what is relevant in a human life, what is meaningful and how it becomes so. This paper introduces the concept of attentional character through a redefinition of attentional capture as achievement. It looks freshly at the attentional capture debate in the current cognitive sciences literature through the lens of Aron Gurwitsch’s gestalt-phenomenology. Attentional character is defined as an initially limited capacity for attending in a given environment and is located within the sphere (...) of attention, primarily as an irrelevant centering in attending. (shrink)

The public defence of science has never been more important than now. However, it is a difficult task with many pitfalls, and there are mechanisms that can make it counterproductive. This article offers advice for science defenders, summarized in ten commandments that warn against potentially ineffective or even backfiring practices in the defence of science: Do not portray science as a unique type of knowledge. Do not underestimate scientific uncertainty. Do not describe science as infallible. Do not deny the value-ladenness (...) of science. Do not associate with power. Do not blame the victims of disinformation. Do not aim at convincing the anti-scientific propagandists. Do not contribute to the legitimization of pseudoscience. Do not attack religion when it does not conflict with science. Do not call yourself a “sceptic”. (shrink)

Reuben Hersh confided to us that, about forty years ago, the late Paul Cohen predicted to him that at some unspecified point in the future, mathematicians would be replaced by computers. Rather than focus on computers replacing mathematicians, however, our aim is to consider the (im)possibility of human mathematicians being joined by “artificial mathematicians” in the proving practice—not just as a method of inquiry but as a fellow inquirer.

John Harris discusses the problem of other minds, not as it relates to other human minds, but rather as it relates to artificial intelligences. He also discusses what might be called bilateral mind-reading: humans trying to read the minds of artificial intelligences and artificial intelligences trying to read the minds of humans. Lastly, Harris discusses whether super intelligent AI – if it could be created – should be afforded moral consideration, and also how we might convince super intelligent AI that (...) we ourselves should be treated with moral consideration. In this commentary, I discuss these issues brought up by Harris. I focus specifically on robots (rather than AI in general), and I set aside future super intelligent AI to instead focus on more limited forms of AI. I argue that the human tendency to attribute minds even to robots with very limited AI and whether such robots should be given moral consideration are more pressing issues than those that Harris discusses, even though I certainly agree with Harris that the potential for super intelligent AI is a fascinating topic to speculate about. (shrink)

Situationist deontic logic is a model of that fraction of normative discourse which refers to only one situation and one set of alternatives. As we can see from a whole series of well-known paradoxes, standard deontic logic (SDL) is seriously mistaken even at the situationist level. In this paper it is shown how a more realistic deontic logic can be based on the assumption that prescriptive predicates satisfy the property of contranegativity. A satisfactory account of situation-specific norms is a necessary (...) prerequisite for a successful treatment of more complex normative structures. (shrink)

In economic analysis, it is usually assumed that each individuals well-being (mental welfare) depends on her or his own resources (material welfare). A typology is provided of the ways in which one persons well-being may depend on the material resources of other persons. When such dependencies are taken into account, standard Paretian analysis of welfare needs to be modified. Pareto efficiency on the level of material resources need not coincide with Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being. A change in (...) economic conditions that is Pareto efficient in the standard sense, i.e., with respect to material resources, may nevertheless sacrifice one persons well-being to that of another. It is shown that under plausible assumptions, Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being may require the reduction of inequality on the level of material resources. (shrink)

Analytical tools that give precision to the concept of "independence of syntax" are developed in the form of a series of substitutivity principles. These principles are applied in a study of the rôle of language in belief revision theory. It is shown that sets of sentences can be used in models of belief revision to convey more information than what is conveyed by the combined propositional contents of the respective sets. It is argued that it would be unwise to programmatically (...) restrain the use of sets of sentences to that of representing propositional contents. Instead, the expressive power of language should be used as fully as possible. Therefore, syntax-independence should not be seen as a criterion of adequacy for language-based models of information-processing, but rather as a property that emerges from some but not all the idealization processes through which such models are constructed. (shrink)

Value statements can be divided into three major groups according to how their criteria of evaluation are specified. The first of these groups consists of those value statements that are unspecified with respect to the criteria of evaluation. Here is one example: Her decision was very good. The second group consists of the viewpoint-specified value statements. In these value statements, an explicit point of view is given, from which the evaluation is made. We often use adverbs such as “morally”, “aesthetically” (...) etc. to express this type of specification. (shrink)

Avdelningen för Filosofi, Institutionen för Filosofi och Teknikhistoria, KTH, Stockholm. Detta dokument får tills vidare fritt användas och kopieras.

Som de första vetenskapliga tidskrifterna brukar man räkna den franska Journal des Sça- vants och den engelska Philosophical Transactions, som båda började ges ut år 1665. Redan under dessa tidskrifters första årtionden skaffade sig redaktörerna vanan att ta hjälp av experter inom olika områden med att granska manuskript. Detta system har sedan dess kommit att utvecklas och systematiseras, och kallas med en svåröversättlig engelsk term ”peer review”. Termen anger att manuskripten granskas av experter inom sitt specialområde. Dessa experter, som kallas (...) ”referees” (referenter) är författarens kolleger inom respektive specialitet, men behöver inte alls vara mer kunniga eller erfarna än författaren själv. Systemet med referentgranskning har ofta kritiserats, men ingen har funnit något bättre sätt att kvalitetsgranska vetenskapliga arbeten än att lämna ut granskningen till experter inom respektive område. (shrink)

Inom hakparentes anges den ordagranna betydelsen, när denna skiljer sig mycket från frasens gängse filosofiska innebörd. På tre- och fler-staviga ord har har ett accenttecken satts in före den betonade vokalen. (Tvåstaviga latinska ord har alltid betoningen på första stavelsen.).

Axel Hägerström is one of the fairly few, if not the only, Swedish philosophers of international significance— yet, he remains in many ways unknown. A major contribution is his theory on the nature of norms and values, which came to be known as value-nihilism, celebrated by some and vehemently rejected by others: Hägerström was the first who formulated a noncognitivist moral theory and debate still continues about the exact significance, scope and implications of this theory. Together with Adolf Phalén, he (...) was one of the two founders of the so-called Uppsala School. He was also the inspirational source of Scandinavian legal realism. Hägerström can be said to be a significant thinker for three reasons: An extraordinary interpreter of his own time, he left his mark on his contemporaries; his thought continues to suggest interesting and contrasting readings, which is indicated by the fact that he is repeatedly re-read by new generations of scholars; finally, he developed general categories that we still use today to understand the world we now live in. This volume collects seventeen chapters of leading experts on Hägerström's philosophical legacy as well as a number of translations of published as well as unpublished manuscripts, collected on occasion of the centenary of Hägerström's prolusion, 'On the Truth of Moral Ideas'. (shrink)